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RESPONSE: SMALL BUSINESS

REORGANIZATION AND THE SABRE
PROPOSALS
Joseph A. Guzinski
When I first read the proposals of the Select Advisory
Committee on Business Reorganization ("SABRE"),' I had two
reactions. On the one hand, I was impressed, as one cannot fail to
be, with the innovative and thoughtful proposals. At the same time
I was puzzled. The SABRE proposals do not deal with what the
proposals purportedly address: the time and expense of Chapter
11.2 Instead, after listening to Professor Karen M. GebbiaPinnetti's presentation at the Eugene P. and Delia S. Murphy
Conference,3 rereading her article' and the report of the
committee,' I have come to the conclusion that the proposals are
intended to deal with the shortcomings of creditor representation
in Chapter 11 cases.
My comments here do not address SABRE's Proposal 1 for a
"Federal Workout Proceeding, 6 which provides for a formal

Acting General Counsel, Executive Office for United States Trustees. The
views expressed in this Article are the author's own and do not necessarily
represent the position of the United States Department of Justice or the
Executive Office for United States Trustees.
1. SABRE: The Select Advisory Committee on Business Reorganization (a
special committee of the American Bar Association's Section of Business Law Business Bankruptcy Committee).
2. Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, First Report on the Select Advisory Committee
on Business Reorganization, 57 Bus. LAW. 164, 169 (2001) [hereinafter SABRE
Report].
3. Professor Karen M. Gebbia-Pinnetti, Address at the Fordham University
School of Law Eugene P. and Delia S. Murphy Conference (Nov. 15, 2001).
4. Karen M. Gebbia-Pinnetti, Small Business Reorganization and the
SABRE Proposals,7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 253 (2002).
5. SABRE Report, supra note 2.

6. Id. at 169-85.
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procedure for workouts before the filing of a Chapter 11 case.7 My
focus is on Proposals 2 and 3, which would apply once a Chapter 11
case has been filed. These proposals rest on a newly courtappointed independent facilitator and a neutral business expert
("neutrals") to aid the Chapter 11 process.
Proposal 2
recommends, among other things, the appointment of an
independent facilitator to assist in plan negotiation during a
Chapter 11 case.'
Proposal 3 suggests that neutrals provide
objective analysis of the debtors' financial information to all parties
in interest.9
Past proposals for neutral facilitators of the bankruptcy
process were attempts to reduce cases that languished in Chapter
11 without any reasonable prospect for reorganization." The
drafters of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 created the United States
Trustee Program in part to address this problem."
The
deliberations of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
considered a type of neutral expert in each Chapter 11 case who
would evaluate the debtor at the early stages of a Chapter 11 case
and report to the court on the debtor's prospects for
reorganization.'2
Data from the past decade demonstrate that the average time
per case spent in Chapter 11 has consistently declined." The
SABRE Report states that its proposed reforms "specifically
identified aspects of Chapter 11 practice that may unnecessarily
7.

Id.

8. Id. at 169.
9. Id.; see also Gebbia-Pinetti, Small Business Reorganization,supra note 4,
at 275-79 (providing a summary of SABRE's Fourth Report).
10. See infra notes 11-12 (providing examples of proposals for independent
monitoring agents).
11. For an explanation of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, see H.R. REP. No.
95-595, at 89, 91-93, 104-06 (1977).
12. For a discussion of "independent monitoring agent" for small business
Chapter 11 cases, see Minutes, The National Bankruptcy Review Commission
(Oct. 18-19, 1996), availableat
http://www.abiworld.org/legis/review/minutes/oct96min.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2002).
13. Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Outcomes of Chapter 11 Cases: US.
Trustee Database Sheds New Light on Old Questions, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb.
1998, at 28.
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increase the cost and time of business reorganizations.""' However,
the report offers no empirical information or other support to
suggest the extent to which "cost and time" is a problem. Perhaps,
just as one can never be too thin or too rich, a Chapter 11 case can
never be said to move too quickly or too cheaply.
Assuming the neutrals proposed by SABRE will be of
assistance in particular cases, the proposal leaves unanswered the
question of the systemic effect of these proposals. Overall, the
time spent in Chapter 11 is down." Reforms like the SABRE
proposals will at some point reach the point of diminishing returns.
Further reductions in cost and expense of Chapter 11 cases may
not be worth the cost of achieving these results. At this point any
reform, from a systemic perspective, is inefficient.
I suggest that the SABRE proposals aim at another, more
deep-seated problem in Chapter 11. This problem is often
described in terms of "time and expense," but is something more
fundamental: the fact that our adversarial model of litigation in
some ways does not serve the reorganization process.
Over twenty-five years ago, the drafters of the Bankruptcy
Code described the problem this way:
The practice in bankruptcy is different for several reasons.
First, there is a public interest in the proper administration of
bankruptcy cases. Bankruptcy is an area where there exists a
significant potential for fraud, for self-dealing, and for diversion
of funds. In contrast to general civil litigation, where cases
affect only two or a few parties at most, bankruptcy cases may
affect hundreds of scattered and ill-represented creditors. In
general civil litigation, a default by one party is relatively
insignificant, and though judges do attempt to protect parties'
rights, they need not be active participants in the case for the
protection of the public interest in seeing disputes fairly
resolved. In bankruptcy cases, however, active supervision is
essential. Bankruptcy affects too many people to allow it to
proceed untended by an impartial supervisor.

In other words, a bankruptcy case will pull into its vortex

14.
15.
16.

SABRE Report, supra note 2, at 167-69.
Bermant & Flynn, supra note 13, at 32.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 88.
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certain parties who do not have enough of an economic interest to
pursue their claims against the debtor. Money owed to creditors,
or that portion of the bankruptcy estate to which they might be
entitled, is at risk unless the debtor's conduct is supervised.
The Bankruptcy Code addresses this problem in two ways.
First, where certain general unsecured creditors have enough of a
stake to pursue their claims, they represent the interests of all
similarly situated creditors through the formation of a creditors'
committee." While pursuing their own interests, they necessarily
protect the interests of creditors who do not actively pursue their
own claims. Second, when circumstances suggest that a trustee
should be appointed to take over possession and management of
the debtor's business, the United States Trustee is given authority
to move for the appointment of a trustee!'
The SABRE proposals appear to be directed at cases where
there is an active creditor constituency. Each of the proposed
neutrals serves as some type of intermediary between the debtor
and creditors who are involved in the negotiation, or are seeking to
influence the reorganization. The proposal for a neutral plan
facilitator and neutral business analysis assumes the existence of
creditors who care enough, are active enough, and have enough at
stake to be interested in the current and future financial condition
of the debtor. Otherwise they will not participate in negotiation of
a plan by the facilitator, and will have no interest in the
information analyzed by the neutral expert.
If the object of the SABRE proposals were truly reduction of
Chapter 11 delay and expense, they would raise questions of why
an active creditor constituency does not work on its own behalf to
minimize these problems. As noted above, the drafters of the
Bankruptcy Code believed that active creditors, if their economic
interest in the case were large enough, would work to minimize the
expense and keep time of confirmation as short as possible because
they would be playing with their own money.' The SABRE

17.
18.

11 U.S.C. § 1102 (2000).
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 104.

19. Id.
20. See generally H.R. REP. No. 95-595 (1977) (noting the expected behavior
of reasonable creditors).
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proposal calls this belief into question. The need for neutral
facilitators to reduce time and expense suggests that economic
interests of an active creditor constituency are not, by themselves,
sufficient to minimize the time and expense of a Chapter 11 case.
More than the terms of the proposals themselves, this suggestion
has profound implications for bankruptcy policy, and calls into
question many of the assumptions about the reorganization
process.
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